1Ill~ <

"
:

ON ANIMALS AND PAIN
ANN SQUIRE
American Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals
pa.in?
This question,
Do animals feel pedn?
engen
simple on its face, is one which has engendered controversy for many years and which
continues to do so today.
The way that each
of us answers this question is important,
attibecause it lays the foundation for our atti
tudes toward and treatment of members of
other species.

extreme pressure on a limb, for instance,
almost universally consists of a cry and
withdrawal of the affected part.
A man who
hits his thumb with a hammer, a cat whose
foot is stepped on, and a roouse whose tail is
pinched show identical response.
This simi
simi1arity of behavior should tell us that ani
animals feel and respond to pa.in
pain in the same way
that humans do.

One of the first roodern .r;nilosophers
r;:hi.losophers to
respond
address the issue was Descartes, who responded in the negative. Animals, Descartes said,
were simply automata which rooved in reaction
to external and internal stimuli but did not
pa.in or pleasure. [1]
Accordingly,
sense pain
there was little reason to be concerned about
the way they were treated.
Many roodern sci
scientists continue to ·look
-look upon the issue of
animal sensitivity as an open question, cit
citing a lack of "proof" that animals can exper
experience feelings similar to our own.
However,
body of evidence-evidence-
there is an overwhelming lxxly
evolutionary-
physiological, behavioral, and evolutionary-which points to the conclusion that animals,
pa.inful
like humans, do feel and respond to painful
stimulation.

Pain also serves as an important signal
pa.inful
that something is wrong. By avoiding painful
stimuli, we minimize the risk of injury and
enhance the chances that we as individuals,
as well as our species, will survive. It is
safe to conclude that an animal without the
capa.city to feel and respond to pa.in
capacity
pain would
not survive for very long.
Given this evidence, can there be any
pa.in?
doubt that animals sense pain?
Clearly, the
answer is no.
But we are not out of the
woods yet.
wocrls
For while roost people will agree
pa.in, not everyone will
that animals feel pain,
concede that they suffer from or . are "bo"bo
thered by" pa.inful
distinc
painful stimulation. The distinction here is between sensation and percep
perception.
While animals may sense pa.in,
pain, many
people argue that they do not perceive it.
This apparent independence of sensation and
perception has allowed otherwise sensitive
cruel
people to subject animals to extreme cruelties with the justification that "they don 't
ccmnon rationale for this
feel it." The roost COIlIIIOn
attitude is the notion that perception re
requires thought--that i f an animal cannot
reflect on its pa.in,
pain, then it cannot suffer.
This argument contains two major fallacies.

First, there are strong physiological
similarities between the nervous systems of
humans and "higher" animals.
A rat, fo;
example, has receptors and sensory nerves
that respond to heat, cold, pressure, and
other stimuli in much the same way as do
human sensory systems.
The brain structures
that mediate pain
pa.in perception are equally well
developed in humans and many other animals
This similarity of structure and
and birds.
function suggests that what pro:luces
produces pa.in
pain in
a human animal should also pro:luce
produce pa.in
pain in an
animal. Indeed, this similarity is routinely
presented as justification for using animals
in experiments designed to predict sanething
about human systems and behavior.

COMMENT

Behavioral evidence also indicates that
pa.in.
animals feel pain.
Behavior displayed in
response to noxious stimulation is remarkably
consistent across species.
The reaction to
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First, there is no conclusive evidence
that animals are incapable of thought.
A
recent story in The National Geographic de
described the relationship between Koko, a
gorilla, and a kitten she had "adopted. II The
grief that Koko showed after the kitten's
death suggests not only the cafacity to think
about a vague concept, i.e., death, but also
the cafacity to experience
psychological

suspected.
If they are like us, are we jus
justified in doing things to animals that we
would not do to other humans?
Or do we have
an obligation to treat animals the way we
would wish to be treated?
Luckily, nure and
roore people are recognizing the similarity
between animals and humans and are demanding
that animals be treated with the considera
consideration and respect that their sentient natures
require.

fain.
Second" there is no evidence that it is
necessary to think in order to suffer. To be
sure, the human caW?ity for thought gives
human suffering an added d:imension--anticifa
d:imension--anticifation of the painful event, remembering it
afterward, and so on. But this does not rrean
that humans suffer any roore acutely. Indeed,
one can imagine a situation l.n which an ani
animal would suffer more than a human precisely
because of the animal' s limited understanding
of the situation. A visit to the veterinari
veterinarian or physician provides a good illustration
of this p:>int.
An animal, not canprehending
what is going on, frequently resp:>nds with
fear and anxiety to the strange surroundings
and unexpected procedures at the veterinari
veterinarian's office.
In the analogous situation, a
human's fears can be allayed by an under
understanding of the procedures to be performed
and the knowledge that the experience will
ultimately benefit the patient's health.
It
can be argued that the animal, because it
lacks understanding of the situation, actual
actually suffers roore than the human. [2]

Notes

1.
See Descartes' Discourse on Method,
Chapter 5, and his letter to Henry More, of
1649.

The fact that animals cannot cemnunicate
with us verbally has reinforced the notion
that they cannot think and, therefore, do not
experience fain.
In a 1984 Congressional
hearing on the steel jaw leghold trap, one
trapping advocate stated that he would not
believe that a trapped animal was in fain
until the animal told him so in our own
language!

2.
Bernard Rollin also discusses this
p:>ssibility in Animal Rights and ~ Moral
Moral~ (Buffalo:
Pranetheus Books, 1981), p.
33.

But, as we have seen, the cafacity to
sense fain is basic and is unrelated to lan
language.
We do not doubt that human infants
feel fain even before they have learned to
talk~ so,
why should the fact that animals
cannot talk lead us to doubt that they feel
fain ? There can be no justification for
applying one set of criteria to humans and a
different set to animals.

eYer be a tropical fish
Whose life is spent in an aquarium
Trapped in what could hanUy be called a world
And destined to wait patiently for food.

Woe, that I should

How

Mark Clayton

All the evidence indicates that animals
are roore similar to humans than we have ever
BEIWEEN THE

SPEX::IES

infinitely better that I should know freedan

And take my chances amidst truer surroundings
Which, though alive with danger and uncertainty
AboIm:i with variety and passicn, as ~l.
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